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Abstract—Instilling resilience in critical infrastructure (CI)
such as dams or power grids is a major challenge for tomorrow’s
cities and communities. Resilience, here, pertains to a CI’s ability
to adapt or rapidly recover from disruptive events. In this paper,
the problem of optimizing and managing the resilience of CIs
is studied. In particular, a comprehensive two-fold framework
is proposed to improve CI resilience by considering both the
individual CIs and their collective contribution to an entire
system of multiple CIs. To this end, a novel analytical resilience
index is proposed to measure the effect of each CI’s physical
components on its probability of failure. In particular, a Markov
chain defining each CI’s performance state and a Bayesian
network modeling the probability of failure are introduced to
infer each CI’s resilience index. Then, to maximize the resilience
of a system of CIs, a novel approach for allocating resources, such
as drones or maintenance personnel, is proposed. In particular,
a comprehensive resource allocation framework, based on the
tools of contract theory, is proposed enabling the system operator
to optimally allocate resources, such as, redundant components
or monitoring devices to each individual CI based on its eco-
nomic contribution to the entire system. The optimal solution
of the contract-based resilience resource allocation problem is
analytically derived using dynamic programming. The proposed
framework is then evaluated using a case study pertaining to
hydropower dams and their interdependence to the power grid.
Simulation results, within the case study, show that the system
operator can economically benefit from allocating the resources
while dams have a 60% average improvement over their initial
resilience indices.
Index Terms—Critical infrastructure, resilience, Bayesian net-
works, contract theory , dynamic programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
CRITICAL infrastructure (CI), such as power grids andtransportation systems, are vital to modern day cities and
communities [1]. As such, maintaining proper operation of
CIs, in presence of failures or security threats, is therefore
a critical challenge. In particular, reliability and resilience
are two key measures that can be used to evaluate the
functionality and the ability of an infrastructure to deliver its
designated service, under potentially disruptive situations. In
practice, there is a significant difference between reliability
and resilience. Reliability is a term that describes the frequency
or the likelihood of a CI’s failure [2]. Resilience, on the other
hand, has multiple definitions that are typically application-
dependent [1]. Most of these definitions pertain to resilience in
This research was supported by the US National Science Foundation under
Grants ACI-1541105 and ACI-1541069.
response to a change in or a corruption to the system’s normal
functionality. A general definition of resilience, given by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) advisory council, is
the ability of an infrastructure to adapt to or rapidly recover
from a potentially disruptive event [3].
The importance of studying reliability and resilience for CIs
stems from the fact that they are prone to many disruptive
events such as natural disasters, hazardous conditions, subver-
sive attacks, aging, or even inadequate maintenance [4]. Thus,
it is crucial for CIs to operate reliably and to be resilient in
face of potential failures and disruptions. Given that CIs cut
across multiple domains that include communications, dams,
power grids, transportation systems, and water systems [5],
and that the resilience lacks a standard definition, resilience
improvement techniques are typically infrastructure-specific,
for instance [2] considered the resilience of water systems, [6]
proposed a framework to improve the resilience of the power
grid, and [7] considered the resilience of petrochemical CIs.
This poses many challenges for assessing and developing
resilience improvement techniques for different-type interde-
pendent CIs. A general framework is therefore needed to
evaluate the resilience of different CIs and to help in design-
ing general resilience improvement techniques. Some studies
in the literature, e.g., [8]–[11], proposed general resilience
frameworks for CIs. However, the approaches proposed in this
prior art mostly evaluate the CI resilience based on satisfying
a number of pre-determined criteria as detailed in the next
section. The resilience measures based on these properties fail
to capture the effect of different disruptive events on the CI.
In contrast, here, our goal is to introduce a general framework
to evaluate and improve CI resilience based on the effect of
disruptive events on the CI’s components. Prior to providing
our key contributions, we will first review existing related
frameworks and techniques in the next section to pinpoint their
limitations.
A. Related Work
Critical Infrastructure resilience has recently attracted sig-
nificant attention [8]–[12]. In [8] the authors considered four
properties for resilience: robustness, redundancy, resourceful-
ness, and rapidity and the resilience was quantified using
four interrelated dimensions: technical (physical), organiza-
tional, social, and economic. The authors in [9] proposed a
resilience framework that seeks to achieve three resilience
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properties pertaining to the ability of a system to absorb the
impacts of perturbations, adapt to undesirable situations, and
quickly return to its normal operations. In [10], a three-stage
framework, reflecting the infrastructure’s resistant, absorptive,
and restorative capacities, is introduced to analyze the re-
silience. The DHS work in [11] developed the notion of a
resilience measurement index (RMI) which is an indicator
to determine the degree to which the elements pertaining to
resilience have been implemented by a CI. These elements
include the preparedness of the CI to possible failures and the
extent to which recovery mechanisms and mitigation measures
are installed. The work in [12] introduced a quantitative
assessment for infrastructure’s resilience using optimal control
design in which recovery processes and costs are integrated
to derive the resilience. However, one key limitation of these
studies, [8]–[12], is that they can be used to compare different
CIs, yet, they do not capture the effect of specific events on
the infrastructure. Therefore, their use is mostly limited to
evaluating the resilience of CI but not to improving it.
Other studies in the literature have focused on improving CI
resilience by allocating CI-specific physical resources [13]–
[16]. In [13], the resilience of a cyber-physical system is
improved by allocating a number of inter-network edges to the
nodes of the interdependent network connecting the system’s
cyber and physical layers. The effect of cascading failure
among nodes is studied to help in the process of resource allo-
cation. The authors in [14] proposed a new approach to repair
system components using a graph-theoretic approach. In [15]
and [16], CI resilience is studied from a general perspective
without defining a quantitative metric for resilience. The
authors in [15] consider the problem of allocating resources to
highway bridges to improve the resilience of a transportation
system. In [16], a framework is proposed to allocate resources
to CIs based on their vulnerability level. Contract theory
is used to formulate the problem to optimize the economic
benefit from the allocated resources which are offered to CIs
through contracts managed by the system operator. Note that,
in [10], beyond defining resilience properties, a framework is
proposed to improve CI resilience. The framework depends
on allocating resources to improve the resilience by hardening
CI’s components, duplicating components, or ensuring rapid
recovery of failed components. The framework is applied to
improve the resilience of a power grid whose components are
the generators and the resources are allocated to the generators.
One limitation of these previous studies [10] and [13]–[16],
is that individual CIs are abstracted within the system, e.g. as
nodes within a generic graph. This provides no information on
improving individual CIs resilience as the solutions introduced
in these studies [10] and [13]–[16] consider the resilience
of an entire system of multiple CIs while being agnostic to
each individual CI’s resilience properties. Indeed, individual
CIs and their specific failures are largely abstracted and not
considered in enough details. Hence, in such prior art, when
resources are allocated within the system, no information is
provided on how to effectively allocate them at the level of
each CI.
In light of the preceding discussions, we propose a gen-
eral framework to study and improve the resilience of CIs.
The framework addresses the resilience at the level of both
individual CIs and their collective effect on an entire system
of multiple CIs. We introduce an analytical resilience index
to quantify the resilience of individual infrastructures and
to give insights about improving this resilience. Resilience
is evaluated as a function of the CI’s probability of failure
derived from the cascading failure of its physical components.
Resources are then allocated to the individual CIs according to
their contribution to the entire system. Examples of resources
here include redundant components or monitoring devices
such as sensors or cameras. Finally, each infrastructure can
use the allocated resources to improve its resilience based
on the introduced allocation algorithm. The key contributions
stemming from this framework are outlined next.
B. Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is a comprehensive
analytical framework for analyzing and optimizing the re-
silience of CIs. The proposed framework can be applied to
different systems and CIs to evaluate their resilience and
optimize it. The framework considers the resilience of each
individual CI and allows improving it based on the economic
contribution of each CI to the entire system of multiple CIs.
We model the CI performance state using a Markov chain
that allows us to derive a novel quantifiable resilience index.
The proposed resilience index relates to the CI’s probability
of failure which is induced from the probabilistic inference
of a Bayesian network modeling the relationships between
the various components of a given CI. The Bayesian network
captures the effect of each component’s failure on the CI’s
probability of failure. This allows calculating the effect of
fixing each component on the probability of failure and hence
on the infrastructure’s resilience index. We also develop an
algorithm, using the Bayesian network, to prioritize each CI’s
components based on their effect on the resilience index. This
algorithm can be used by individual CIs to determine the order
in which they should secure their key components through
external resources.
A case study pertaining to hydropower dams is introduced
to highlight the importance of the proposed framework and to
evaluate its performance. Within this case study, a hydropower
dam’s resilience is evaluated based on its probability of suc-
cessfully generating electricity. We propose a new approach for
improving the dam’s resilience by securing its main compo-
nents using external resources. The problem of allocating these
resources to multiple dams, based on their economic contri-
bution to the entire system (the power grid), is modeled using
contract theory [17] and the optimal solution to this problem
is derived using dynamic programming. Through simulations,
we show that both the system operator and individual CIs can
benefit from the process of resource allocation. The system
operator can maximize its reward from the allocated resources
using contract theory, while CIs significantly improve their
resilience indices.
Fig. 1: Organization of the paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as summarized in
Fig. 1. The Markov chain model and the analytical analysis
for deriving the resilience index is presented in Section II.
The Bayesian network analysis and components’ prioritization
algorithm is discussed in Section III. The case study of
hydropower dams and the optimal solution to the problem of
CI resource allocation is derived in Section IV. Numerical
results are presented and analyzed in Section V. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. EVALUATING THE RESILIENCE OF CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE USING MARKOV CHAINS
Consider a critical infrastructure whose performance at a
given time n is a function of the state of the system as captured
by the random variable Yn. Yn can take values from a set
{S,W,F} whose values represent three CI states: success (S),
warning (W ), and failure (F ). The success state, S, represents
normal service, i.e., the infrastructure is properly delivering its
designated service. The CI will be in a warning state, W , with
the occurrence of a partial failure to its components that may
lead to a complete failure. The failure state, F , represents the
failure of the CI to deliver its designated service. This failure
can occur either suddenly due to, e.g., natural disasters, or as
a result of a partial failure from a previous warning state. We
introduce a Markov chain to model these states as shown in
Fig. 2.
The transition probabilities between the different states can
be induced from the Markov chain. Let PAB = Prob[Yn+1 =
B|Yn = A] where A,B ∈ {S,W,F}. Then, the full transition
probability matrix P will be given by:
P =
PSS PSW PSFPWS PWW PWF
PFS PFW PFF
 . (1)
The values within each row of P will sum to 1 as they
represent the probability distribution for all possible next states
whenever the system is at a specific state.
Fig. 2: Markov chain modeling the states of a CI.
In practice, it is intuitive to assume that the probability PFW
is zero. This is due to the fact that, once a failure happens,
the CI will either remain at this state or will recover to the
success state not to a warning state. Here, we also assume that,
whenever the infrastructure is at a warning state, it is either
fixed and restored to a success state or it continues to fail and
eventually goes to a failure state. This transition is based on
the actions taken at a given time step, however, there is still
a small probability that no action is taken at this time step
as captured by the probability of remaining in the warning
state PWW . We assume that PWW is fixed to a value  which
should be small. Based on these assumptions, the transition
probability can be simplified, as follows:
P =
PSS PSW PSFPWS  1− − PWS
PFS 0 1− PFS
 . (2)
Note that, the probability matrix P specifies transition
probabilities for a single time step. Transition probabilities
for n time steps can be calculated as P n. The probabilities
of being at a given state i.e., P (S), P (W ), and P (F ), can be
calculated using P n and the vector of the initial probability
distribution of being at each state U0, as follows:
Un = U0 · P n, (3)
where Un = [uSn , u
W
n , u
F
n ] is the probability distribution
vector of being at each state after n time steps.
We define the resilience γ of an infrastructure to be the
reciprocal of the probability of being in the failure state in the
long run as:
γ = lim
n→∞
1
uFn
, (4)
where uFn is the probability corresponding to the failure state
in the vector Un. This probability will always exist if the
Markov chain is irreducible as shown in [18], i.e., there is
no absorbing state. In practice, the chain in Fig. 2 cannot
have an absorbing state so it is irreducible. The resilience
here, is inversely proportional to the probability of failure thus
reducing the probability of failure will increase the resilience.
Reducing the long run probability of failure implies that the CI
will have fewer time steps at the failure state which conforms
to the definition in [3]. Note that, relating the resilience to the
probability of failure was introduced in [2] however, in [2],
the CI was allowed to only operate in either a satisfactory or
a failure state.
To calculate the value of γ, the value of uFn needs to be
evaluated at high values of n which in turn will depend on
P n. The powers of P for high values of n can be calculated
in advance if P is a regular transition matrix [18]. The
powers P n are shown to converge to a matrix V in which
all rows are the same and each row is a strictly positive
probability distribution vector [18] if P is a regular transition
matrix. Converging to a constant matrix means any further
multiplications of V with P will not change V , i.e.,
V · P = V . (5)
As all rows in V are the same, the probability vector Un, in
(3), will no longer depend on the initial probability distribution
U0. Multiplying the values of U0, which sum up to 1, with
the constant columns of V will yield the same constant values
of V . Hence, (3) can then be written as:
Un = U0 · V = V . (6)
Let the vector v be the constant row of V which assigns dif-
ferent transition probabilities to all possible states. According
to (5), this vector will satisfy the following property:
v · P = v. (7)
As discussed earlier, matrix V only exists if matrix P is
a regular Markov matrix. In the following theorem, we prove
the necessary conditions that P must satisfy in order to be a
regular Markov matrix.
Theorem 1. The probability transition matrix P is a regular
Markov matrix.
Proof. Let v = [vS , vW , vF ], then, the values of vS , vW , vF
can be computed using (7), as follows:
vS = vS · PSS + vW · PWS + vF · PFS ,
vW = vW · PSW + vW · ,
vF = vS · PSF + vW · PWF + vF · PFF ,
vS + vW + vF = 1. (8)
The solution of this set of equations gives the values:
vS =
(1− ) · PFS
PFS · (1− + PSW ) + (1− ) · (1− PSS)− PWS · PSW
.
vW =
PFS · PSW
PFS · (1− + PSW ) + (1− ) · (1− PSS)− PWS · PSW
.
vF = 1− PFS · (1− + PSW )
PFS · (1− + PSW ) + (1− ) · (1− PSS)− PWS · PSW
.
(9)
Substituting PWS in the denominator by 1 −  − PWF , the
denominator can be written as PFS · (1− + PSW ) + PSW ·
PWF + (1 − ) · PSF , with all the terms being positive.
The numerators can then determine the sign of the values of
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Fig. 3: PS convergence with number of iterations.
vS , vW , vF . It is obvious that vS , vW , vF will have positive
values if PSW , PFS are nonzero. However, if PSW equals
zero, there will be no transition to the warning state when the
CI starts at the success state. This implies that the warning
state will be isolated which contradicts the fact that the chain is
irreducible. The assumption PFS is zero also cannot hold from
a practical point of view since in this case the infrastructure
cannot be recovered to the success state hence is not resilient.
This shows that the values vS , vW , vF will always be
positive hence they represent valid transition probabilities
which proves that P is a regular Markov matrix. 
After deriving the convergence values, the resilience of an
infrastructure will then be:
γ = lim
n→∞
1
uFn
=
1
vF
. (10)
To shed some light on the number of time steps, i.e., powers
(iterations) needed for the matrix P to converge to V , three
different CIs are examined as shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
Fig. 3 shows the values of PS when it reaches a constant
value after some time steps, similarly, Fig. 4 shows the values
of PW . In this example, the first CI has high probability of
being at a success state, PSS = 0.7 and high probabilities of
returning to the success state, PWS = PFS = 0.7. Fig. 3 and
Fig. 4 show that the convergence occurs at n = 3 time steps.
The second CI has a high probability of being at a success
state PSS = 0.8 but lower transition probabilities PWS =
0.2 and PFS = 0.3. The convergence in this case occurs at
n = 7 time steps. Finally, the third CI has a low probability
PSS = 0.4 and high transition probabilities PWS = 0.9 and
PFS = 0.7 and, hence, its convergence occurs approximately
at n = 6 time steps. Clearly, only a few time steps are needed
for each CI’s transition matrix to converge which corroborates
the practicality of our proposed approach.
In our model, we are interested in studying the effect of
improving the probability PWS , on the CI’s resilience. This is
because, we want to increase the transition probability from
warning (W ) state to the success state (S) thus reducing the
probability of failure. To this end, we evaluate the rate of
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Fig. 5: Resilience index change with the probability PWS .
change of the resilience index with respect to the probability
PWS , as given by:
∂vF
∂PSW
=
−PFS · PSW · (1− + PSW )(
PFS · (1− + PSW ) + (1− ) · (1− PSS)− PWS · PSW
)2 . (11)
This rate of change is strictly negative which implies that
vF will always decrease with the increase of PWS . From (9)
and (10), it can be clearly seen that the resilience will have a
positive rate of change with respect to the probability PWS .
Finally, we define the resilience index θ of a CI as:
θ =
γ
γmax
=
vFmin
vF
, (12)
where vFmin is the minimum value of v
F that can be achieved
at the maximum value of PWS = 1−  when substituted into
(9) and (10). This value achieves a maximum resilience γmax.
It is straightforward to show that θ is positive with θ ≤ 1. The
resilience index in this way helps to evaluate how far each CI
is from its maximum achievable resilience. It can also help to
compare different CIs as their resilience is measured on the
same scale. Fig. 5 shows the values of the resilience index
with the increasing values of PWS for different  values when
PSS = 0.8, PFS = 0.5.
Next, we study how to compute the probability PWS for an
infrastructure and the effect of improving this probability on
the resilience of a given CI. A Bayesian network is defined
for this purpose as explained next.
III. BAYESIAN NETWORK MODEL FOR CI PROBABILITY
OF FAILURE
To compute PWS , we need to evaluate the probability of
failure of a CI, given the probability of failure of each of
its individual components. Since the failure of one or more
components can cause other components to fail, we need
to consider the relationship between the components when
computing PWS . To this end, a Bayesian network [19] is a
suitable framework.
A. Bayesian Networks: Preliminaries
A Bayesian network is a network that describes the causality
and relationship between independent random variables under
incomplete information [19]. A Bayesian network is normally
represented by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) in which each
node represents one random variable. Let G(X ,E ) be a
Bayesian network, then X = {X1, . . . , Xn} is the set of
nodes which represent different random variables and E is
a set of directed edges. A directed edge from a node Xj to
Xi means that node Xi depends on the node Xj and in this
case Xj is called the parent of node Xi. A node can have
multiple parents and the set of parent for a node Xi is given
by pi(Xi). Every variable Xi can take a value from a finite set
of values, e.g., if the variables are binary they can either be
true or false. Finally each node is associated with a conditional
probability table (CPT) while roots, i.e, nodes without parents,
are assigned direct probabilities. A CPT for a node Xi gives
the conditional probabilities between Xi and every node in
pi(Xi).
Consider a Bayesian network with binary values, each
variable in the network can be either true (T ) or false (F )
with a given probability. For a variable C1, its T and F
probabilities, i.e, P (C1) = T , P (C1) = F are written as
P (c1), P (c¯1) where the lowercase letter indicates a value of
the variable. The probabilities within each variable sum to
1, i.e., P (c1) + P (c¯1) = 1. If a variable, e.g. D1, has two
parents C1 and C2, then the CPT of D1 will have eight entries
representing the possible combinations of C1 and C2 with the
T and F values of D1. However, as the T and F values for
any variable sum to 1, only half of the CPT entries must be
stored, i.e., the T values of D1.
Once the probabilities and the CPTs are assigned, proba-
bilistic inference can be performed to calculate the probability
of any variable given some evidence in the network. Calcu-
lating probabilistic inference in general Bayesian networks in
known to be NP-Hard [20], however, Pearl [21] introduced a
polynomial time algorithm to perform probabilistic inference
in singly connected Bayesian networks. A singly connected
Bayesian network, also known as a polytree, is a Bayesian
network where it has no loops, i.e., there is only one path
between any two nodes in its underlying undirected graph.
Fig. 6: A Bayesian network representing the hierarchical
failure events within a CI’s components.
B. Evaluating CI Probability of Failure
For our resilience problem, we introduce a Bayesian net-
work to model the possible failure events of a given CI that
can prevent it from delivering its designated service. We model
the various possible failure events of the components of a CI
which can lead to total CI failure with a given probability. The
total failure probability calculated from this Bayesian network
will effectively represent the transition probability PWF as
this is the probability with which a partial failure causes a
total failure. On the other hand, failure events, such as natural
disasters, that can cause a sudden CI failure, are not captured
by this network. They can be modeled in a separate network
to calculate the transition probability PSF .
The Bayesian network is constructed such that failure events
are modeled as variables (nodes) in a hierarchical way. Nodes
are grouped into levels where failures in one level can cause
failures in the next level. Fig. 6 shows the structure of the
proposed Bayesian network in which the number of nodes
and levels vary according to each infrastructure. Roots in the
network, (C1, C2, C3, D2, . . . , Dn), represent possible failure
events to respective CI components. Failure, here, can happen
due to external effects or normal wear-and-tear of the compo-
nents. The subsequent levels represent the cascading failure to
other major components, e.g. Z1 and Z2. These major failures
can, in turn, cause a failure in their next level, with given
probabilities, and so on until the whole infrastructure fails.
The CI failure is represented by the single leaf in the Bayesian
network.
As the variables represent failure events, they can be either
true (T ) or false (F ) with a given probability. A T value
implies that the failure event has occurred and F means it has
not occurred. Root variables are assigned T and F probabil-
ities, while the variables at subsequent levels are associated
with conditional probabilities for the possible combinations
of their parents’ values. Probabilistic inference can then be
performed to compute the total probability of failure, of a CI
according to the failure probabilities of its components. Note,
the proposed network in Fig. 6 is a singly connected Bayesian
network and, hence, probabilistic inference can be performed
in polynomial time.
To compute the probability of failure PWF for any given
CI, we start by calculating the prior marginal probability
of failure. This probability is calculated from the initial as-
signed probabilities. Assume, without loss of generality, that
Xn ∈ X is the variable representing the failure, then the
prior marginal probability of xn, the T value of Xn, can be
calculated in a manner analogous to [22]:
P (xn) =
∑
X \Xn
P (x1, . . . , xn), (13)
where P (x1, . . . , xn) is the joint probability for all the in-
stantiations of the independent random variables X1, . . . , Xn.
The summation is calculated over all variables except Xn, thus
these variables are marginalized from the joint probability. The
joint probability in (13) is given by:
P (x1, . . . , xn) =
n∏
i=1
P (xi|pi(xi)), (14)
where P (xi|pi(xi)) = P (xi) when the set pi(Xi) is empty.
This prior marginal probability P (xn) represents the initial
PWF in our CI Markov chain model. It can be used to
calculate the initial resilience index of a given CI. Then,
the effect of each node on improving the resilience index
can be calculated and, hence, the components of a CI can
be prioritized based on their effect on PWF . However, the
effect of each component should not be considered separately,
as securing a component will reduce PWF which will also
reduce the effect of other components on PWF . The proposed
procedure for sorting the components is given next.
We calculate the posterior marginal probability of failure
given the evidence of each root variable separately. Let the
number of root variables be m < n. Then, the marginal
probability will be given by [22]:
P (xn|x¯i) =
∑
X \Xn
P (x1, . . . , xn|x¯i), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (15)
where x¯i is the evidence value for the variable Xi when
P (Xi) = F . We consider the false (failure) probability to
capture the positive effect of a variable on the total probability
of failure. This is calculated for all root variables and the
values are sorted in a descending order. The variable that
causes the greatest reduction in PWF then represents the first
component of the CI that must be overhauled. This variable is
also used as a new evidence variable in the Bayesian network
to determine the second most affecting variable (component)
from the remaining roots.
Assume without loss of generality that X1 is the root with
the most effect on PWF , then the next posterior marginal
probability is calculated considering only the x¯1 instantiation
of X1. The probability is calculated for the remaining root
variables individually as given by:
P (xn|x¯1, x¯i) =∑
X \Xn,X1
P (x1, . . . , xn|x¯1, x¯i), i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. (16)
Algorithm 1: Variables Sorting According to Their Effect
Input: Bayeian network variables X where Xn ∈X is
the only leaf representing the failure
Output: A sorted set of the root variables S
begin
Calculate the prior marginal probability of failure
P (xn)
for each root node do
Calculate the posterior marginal probability
P (xn|x¯i)
Calculate the variable’s effect P (xn)− P (xn|x¯i)
Sort variables descendant according to their effect
Determine the variable Xi with the greatest effect
Store the variable Xi in the set S
Define the partial set Xr as the set of roots
excluding Xi
while The set Xr is not empty do
for each node Xj ∈Xr do
Calculate the posterior marginal probability
P (xn|x¯i, x¯j)
Calculate the variable’s effect
P (xn|x¯i)− P (xn|x¯i, x¯j)
Determine the variable Xj with the greatest effect
Store the variable Xj in the set S
Update the set Xr =Xr \Xj
return S
This procedure is applied to all the roots adding one root
to the evidence variables each time. The procedure will end
by sorting all the components of a CI in a descending order
according to their effect on the probability of failure. The steps
of this procedure are summarized in Algorithm 1.
Note that, according to (14), the joint probability considers
the parents of each node. Thus, (16) can be derived from (15)
by considering changes in the branch between the leaf node
and the new variable only. All the other summations in (15)
will not change as the evidence variable does not belong to
this branch. This allows a reduction in the complexity of cal-
culating the updated probabilities after fixing the components.
Algorithm 1 can then be used by any CI to determine the
order according to which it must fix its components. As CIs
typically allocate resources to improve their resilience [10],
[13]–[16], Algorithm 1 can help CIs to determine the compo-
nents to which resources will be allocated within each CI.
Here, we note that, in practice, CIs operate within larger
systems (e.g., an entire city) that are composed of multiple,
interdependent CIs that collectively provide a common service.
As such, the function loss of one CI will impact other interde-
pendent CIs and, therefore, when analyzing the resilience of
a large-scale system, one must consider all the interdependent
CIs. This, in turn, brings forward a new problem of allocating
resources, such as monitoring devices among a system of
multiple CIs which is addressed next. Within the context of
resource allocation, Algorithm 1 is applied by each CI to make
the best use of its allocated resources.
IV. RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR OPTIMIZED RESILIENCE
As evident from the previous discussion, our next step is
to study the problem of allocating resources in a system of
multiple CIs, while taking into account the individual Bayesian
network model of each CI. Resources can range from cyber
resources to personnel or physical equipment. We classify re-
sources into two categories: preventive and rapid intervention
resources. Preventive resources are resources that help CI’s
components become less vulnerable to failures. This might
include replacing some components with more reliable ones or
installing redundant components. Rapid intervention resources,
on the other hand, requires monitoring and alarming systems to
be deployed and requires the existence of on-site facilities that
can be used to fix or replace corrupted components in a timely-
manner. The choice of either category of resources depends
on the nature of the infrastructure and the cost of using
each. For instance, in a power plant, preventive resources can
represent installing redundant switches or replacing old stators,
while rapid intervention resources can represent excessive
monitoring of the generators to repair any defects once they
occur to help keep the generator working.
As resources are infrastructure-specific, we introduce an
application-specific case study to highlight the importance of
our framework. Though the framework can be applied to any
CI, studying the problem of resource allocation within the
context of a specific CI, as a case study, helps better illustrate
our framework, as shown next.
A. Hydropower dams: A case study
We apply the proposed framework to hydropower dams
and their impact on power systems as a practical CI in order
to measure the resilience improvement that can be achieved.
Dams are classified as one of the critical infrastructure sectors
according to the US DHS [5]. Hydropower dams provide
a good platform to apply our proposed framework as they
have many connected components that could be affected by
numerous failure events. Recall that, according to our proposed
framework, failure will be defined as the inability of the dam
to produce electricity.
A Bayesian network is designed for each dam where
the parents to the node representing failure are the dam’s
main components such as penstocks, generators, turbines and
transformers. In turn, these variables are modeled as children
nodes of the variables representing smaller components such
as stators, rotors, intake gates, and blades. Components are
connected in a hierarchical manner until the roots that repre-
sent small components failure. Fig. 7 shows a scheme for a
hydropower dam highlighting its main physical components
along with part of the Bayesian network defined for this dam.
We use previous failure statistics and reliability analyses [23]
to assign probabilities of failure to the roots of the Bayesian
network. Conditional probabilities between components are
assigned based on the components’ relations similar to method
used in fault trees. Note that the same method of assigning
probabilities can be applied to any other CI.
Fig. 7: A Bayesian network model for the hydropower dam in
which each node defines the failure probability for one of the
physical components all the way to the total CI failure.
From a resources perspective, preventive resources are seen
as a long-term solution to improve the resilience of dams in
service. Preventive resources require some components to be
replaced, which might not be applicable when the dam is in
service. Therefore, we focus on rapid intervention resources
which include monitoring devices, such as sensors and cam-
eras, and maintenance equipment. We propose to use both
fixed sensors and drones in the monitoring process. Drones
can be used in general to inspect areas of interest in CIs [24]
and help to inspect hard-to-reach points where conventional
sensors/monitoring methods cannot be used. Recently, the use
of drones to inspect even the inner parts of the dam was shown
to be applicable in [25]. In this work, the authors modified a
drone and used it to inspect the inside of the pentstocks of a
number of dams. Mechanical robots on the other hand can be
used to inspect a dam’s key sections that cannot be reached
by drones such as underwater components [26].
The majority of dams in the United States, are privately
owned [27] and their owners are responsible for their safety.
However, there is still a federal role for ensuring dams’ safety
as dams can severely affect persons and properties in case
of failure. The same applies to electricity supply, the failure
of a dam to generate electricity will affect huge parts of the
electric grid that it supplies. These facts reveal the importance
of having a system operator to manage the process of resource
allocation within multiple dams. The system operator is con-
sidered as a centralized agency that provides the resources to a
dam, or more, to increase their resilience and hence can avoid
long interruptions to the electric service. Having a system
operator that can manage the resources, especially drones, is
useful as the operation of drones is regulated by the federal
aviation administration (FAA) [28] and is not granted to all
private organizations. In the following, we will use a general
notion of resources, without being restricted to drones, as the
framework can be applied to any type of resources.
Next, we formulate the problem of allocating resources
within a system of multiple dams (CIs). We propose to use
contract theory, a powerful framework from microeconomics
that provides useful tools for designing contractual agreements
between a principal and a number of agents [17]. The system
operator is modeled as the principal and the owner of dams
as agents, as discussed next in more details.
B. Resource Allocation using Contract Theory
We consider a system in which an electric grid operator,
referred to as the principal, is interested in providing a number
of resources to the owners of dams to be used in the process
of surveillance and rapid intervention. Let N be the set
of N targeted dams. Dams are assumed to have different
owners. These dams, being part of the grid, sell their generated
electricity to the power grid managed by the principal. Each
dam can utilize the resources to improve its resilience and
hence reduce the probability of failure to generate electricity.
The principal has a limited number of discrete (integer
valued) resources R to be allocated to the dams and, hence, it
decides on how to optimally use these resources. The goal of
the principal is to invest in improving the probability of power
generation and, hence, decreasing the probability of losses due
to a dam’s failure. We model the principal’s payoff as the
difference between the total rewards it gets from the dams’
owners and the total expected losses due to each dam’s failure.
Losses are modeled as a function of the total probability of
failure before and after the deployment of resources. The total
utility Zp(R) that the principal achieves as a function of the
vector of resource allocation R is given by:
Zp(R) = c ·
N∑
i=1
Ri −
N∑
i=1
(αfi − αR) ·Bi(Ri) · ni · Pi, (17)
where R is the resource allocation vector across all dams with
each element Ri specifying the number of resources allocated
to dam i, αfi is the expected real-time energy price if dam
i fails to generate electricity, αR is the average real-time
energy price in normal operation, Pi is the contracted power
production for dam i, ni the expected number of hours the dam
will be out-of-service due to failure, and c is the monetary
reward the principal gets for a unit of resources which can
also be seen as a cost. Note that, the resources in (17) refers
to monitoring resources or drones as discussed earlier. We
introduce the function Bi(Ri) to measure the improvement
in the resilience of a CI i due to the amount of allocated
resources. Specifically, the CI evaluates the difference in its
resilience index before and after using the resources Ri, and
Bi(Ri) is given as:
Bi(Ri) = γ
−1
iRi
− γ−1i = vFRi − vF , (18)
where γiRi and v
F
Ri
are the values calculated from (9) and (10)
respectively for the updated values of PWS . These updated
values are calculated from the Bayesian network as the result
of fixing a number of variables equal to Ri according to the
order specified by Algorithm 1. The effect of the first unit of
resources on PWS , for each dam, is calculated from (15) while
the effect of the remaining resources is calculated from (16) for
each additional unit of resources. Without loss of generality,
we assume that each component of a CI can be secured by a
single unit of resources.
Each dam’s owner will evaluate the amount of resources it
receives based on the resilience enhancement that will result
from the allocated resources. This resilience improvement is
reflected by a higher probability of generating power and,
hence, a higher probability to sell the generated power with
the real-time prices. The utility Zdi(Ri) of dam i is defined
as follows:
Zdi(Ri) = αdi ·Bi(Ri) · ni · Pi − c ·Ri, (19)
where αdi is the average day-ahead energy price for dam i.
The remaining parameters are similar to those in (17).
The principal wants to offer contracts to the dam’s owners
to maximize its utility in (17). A contract [17] can be seen
as an agreement between the principal and the dam’s owner
using which the principal provides and operates resources to
monitor, inspect, and fix points of interest in the dam and
gets monetary rewards in return. Every contract is defined as
a pair (Ri, c · Ri) representing the amount of resources and
the monetary reward (cost) the dam’s owner should pay for
these resources.
In our model, we assume the principal has complete in-
formation about the targeted dams. This information should
be provided by each dam’s owner as the resource evaluation,
from the Bayesian network, is dam-specific and cannot be
estimated by the principal without the dam owners. Moreover,
the principal, being the system operator, already knows all
of the other parameters. Hence, the focus of the principal is
to design contracts in a way to ensures each dam’s owner
participation in order to maximize its total benefit. Contracts
offered by the principal should then satisfy the key property
of individual rationality, under which each dam’s owner is
interested to participate only if the benefit it gets is greater
than or equal to the amount it pays , i.e.,
αdi ·Bi(Ri) · ni · Pi − c ·Ri ≥ 0. (20)
The principal can then design the optimal contracts by
maximizing its utility and satisfying the constraints as follows:
max
Ri
c ·
N∑
i=1
Ri −
N∑
i=1
(αfi − αR) ·Bi(Ri) · ni · Pi, (21)
s.t. αdi ·Bi(Ri) · ni · Pi − c ·Ri ≥ 0, i ∈ N ,
N∑
i=1
Ri = R.
C. Optimal Contract
Solving the problem in (21) is challenging as the function
Bi(Ri) is not continuous. Bi(Ri) has discrete values for a
finite set of Ri values. To address this challenge, we first start
by inspecting the properties of the function Bi(Ri) in order
to solve the problem in (21).
Proposition 1. The values of the function Bi(Ri) represent a
monotonically increasing concave sequence.
Proof. We prove this proposition by showing how the values
of Bi(Ri) are calculated. Let the values ai−1, ai, ai+1 be any
three consecutive values for the improvement in PWF achieved
by fixing any three consecutive variables as calculated from
Algorithm 1. These values satisfy the following two properties:
ai−1 ≥ ai ≥ ai+1,
ai−1 − ai ≥ ai − ai+1, (22)
according to the selection criteria defined in Algorithm 1 in
which the biggest improvement is captured first.
Let bi−1, bi, bi+1 be the values calculated from (18) for the
updated PWS values for ai−1, ai, ai+1, respectively. Each bi
is the difference between the updated vFRi and the current v
F .
According to (11), the values of vFRi are inversely proportional
to the PWS values, hence, the values bi−1, bi, bi+1 follow the
same relation and it can be seen that bi = f( 1ai ). Therefore, we
can conclude that the sequence is monotonically increasing:
bi−1 ≤ bi ≤ bi+1, (23)
and the difference relation becomes:
bi+1 − bi ≤ bi − bi−1. (24)
Rewriting the last inequality we get:
bi+1 + bi−1 ≤ 2 · bi, (25)
which proves that the sequence is concave [29]. 
Using Proposition 1 with the first constraint in problem
(21), we can see that the constraint is a difference between a
monotonically increasing concave sequence αdi ·Bi(Ri)·ni ·Pi
and a strictly increasing linear sequence c ·Ri. The result will
be a concave sequence that can have both positive and negative
values depending on the difference between the two sequences.
This result is used by the principal to determine the range of
values, i.e. [Rimin , Rimax ], that meets the first constraint and,
hence, will be acceptable for the dam’s owners as it satisfied
individual rationality.
Next, we study the properties of the objective function in
(21) based on the results of the previous proposition.
Lemma 1. The objective function in (21) is a convex sequence
with respect to each dam that is monotonically increasing.
Proof. We prove this lemma by showing the relation between
the terms of the objective function. For a given dam i, the
objective function is the difference between the reward c ·Ri
and a constant number (αfi − αR) · ni · Pi multiplied by the
concave function Bi(Ri). The reward term represents a linear
strictly increasing function in the number of resources Ri,
while the second term is monotonically increasing concave
function. Clearly, the difference between both terms will be a
monotonically increasing convex sequence. 
According to Lemma 1, while being convex, the objective
function might have negative values until a certain amount of
resources is used, that is when the second term is higher than
the rewards term. The principal can use this value to update
the minimum number of resources, i.e. Rimin , that should be
allocated to each dam to represent a feasible solution to the
principal. The update is done based on the larger of the two
minimum values calculated in proposition 1 and Lemma 1.
After determining the range of possible values for each
allocation, the principal can use dynamic programming op-
timization [30] techniques to calculate the solution to the
problem in (21). In the dynamic programming representation,
stages will represent the current allocation of resources for
each dam. The state of each stage represents the current value
of the objective function. The update from a stage to another,
i.e., from an allocation to another, aims to increase the value
of the objective function. If no increase can be achieved at
one stage, then the current allocation is the optimal. This is
shown next.
Theorem 2. The optimal resource allocation can be found
using dynamic programming by updating the number of re-
sources assigned to each dam at each stage while maximizing
the benefits of each allocation.
Proof. The values of the objective function are calculated at
each value of the resources Ri in the feasible range for each
dam i, [Rimin , Rimax ]. These values are stored for all dams as
a matrix of size N · R. Each value zi,k in the matrix is
the objective function value evaluated for dam i when it is
assigned a number of resources k. The values of each row
represent a monotonically increasing sequence as shown in
Lemma 1.
The first stage in the problem starts by allocating the
maximum feasible resources k to the dam i with the highest
objective function value, i.e., Ri = k for the dam with
Rimax = k and zi,k is the largest among all other dams. As
the values for this dam i represent a convex sequence and are
monotonically increasing, the principal will not gain more by
assigning a lower number of resources to this specific dam.
Since this value of zi,k is the maximum among all dams, this
allocation represents the maximum value that the principal can
get for this number of resources k. The rest of the resources,
i.e., R − k are assigned to dam j having the largest zj,R−k
among all dams.
This allocation represents the optimal solution at the first
stage as the principal gets the highest utility for the current
resource configuration. The principal then tries to get a higher
utility by changing the current allocation scheme. The prin-
cipal might be able to do so by decreasing the number of
resources k assigned to dam i and assigning the difference to
another dam j if the following condition holds:
zi,k−zi,k−1 < zj,R−k+1−zj,R−k , j = 1, . . . , N, j 6= i, (26)
where k decreases by one unit of resources each time. The
principal compares the utility gains that it can achieve by
assigning more resources to another dam. These resources are
taken from the dam with most resources. The current allocation
ensures that the principal gets the largest utility from the
allocated resources, so it is the optimal solution at this stage.
Here, if the principal cannot increase its utility by changing
a unit of resources, then it will try to change more than one
at a time until the condition is satisfied or all the values of
resources are checked.
The procedure continues at each stage by assigning less
resources to the dam with the most resources if a higher
utility can be achieved by allocating these resources to another
dam. This ensures that the principal achieves its maximum
utility at each stage. This procedure by starting at the final
allocation and moving backward ensuring the maximum utility
is achieved at each stage satisfies the Bellman equation [31]
which is the necessary optimality condition in dynamic pro-
gramming, Hence, the procedure achieves the optimal resource
allocation. 
The complexity of calculating the optimal resource allo-
cation for the previous dynamic programming problem is
O
(
N · (Rmax −Rmin)
)
where:
Rmax = max(Ri,max), i = 1, . . . , R,
Rmin = min(Ri,min), i = 1, . . . , R, (27)
as for each number of resources in the range [Rmax −Rmin],
the program at most compares the utility function N times for
each of the N dams.
Finally, we summarize our framework steps in the flow
chart shown in Fig. 8. Note that the problem discussed in
this section, though discussed within the context of a case
study, can be to used to allocate resources in other systems of
multiple CIs. Selecting a specific CI, hydropower dams here,
helped to design meaningful Bayesian networks and to define
CIs utilities in the contract-based allocation. Next, we show
some numerical results built on the selected case study, i.e.,
hydropower dams.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Although our framework can be applied to any number
of dams, for our simulations, we consider a case of two
dams, in order to better highlight each dam’s effect on the
process of resource allocation. Two Bayesian networks are
designed for the two dams using similar components but
with different probabilities. In the following experiments, the
transition probabilities are assumed to be the same for both
dams PSS = 0.8, PSW = 0.15, PFS = 0.5, and  = 0.1.
However, the first dam is assumed to have a lower initial
PWF = 0.37 while the second dam will have PWF = 0.7.
Other parameters are set as follows: αd1 = $26, αd2 =
$20, P1 = 120 MW/h, P2 = 150 MW/h, n1 = 30 hours,
Fig. 8: Flowchart for the proposed mechanism.
n2 = 20 hours, αR = $33, αf1 = $40, and αf2 = $46. αf2 is
assumed to be higher than αf1 as P2 is assumed to be higher
than P1, so the failure of the second dam will have a larger
effect on increasing the prices of power.
In Fig. 9, we show how the total probability of failure
vF can be reduced by overhauling each dam’s components.
The components are overhauled using the allocated resources
in the order specified by Algorithm 1 then the variables
representing these components are adjusted in the Bayesian
network. Note that, when vF decreases, both the resilience γ
and the resilience index θ increase according to (10) and (12).
We can see that the second dam achieves a higher reduction in
the probability of failure vF . This because the second dam has
a higher initial PWF , so the difference between the initial and
final PWF is higher resulting in a higher difference in vF . This
difference represents the function Bi(Ri) as in (18). Fig. 9
also corroborates Proposition 1 by clearly showing that the
improvement in each dam follows a monotonically increasing
concave sequence.
Fig. 10 shows the benefit that each dam receives from the
allocated resources, evaluated as the first term of (19) before
subtracting the cost, which is a function of Bi(Ri). The figure
shows the cost of the resources separately. The intersection
between the cost and each dam’s benefit will represent the
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Fig. 9: Dam’s probability of failure improvement with the
number of overhauled components (their related variables are
adjusted in the Bayesian network).
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Fig. 10: Dam’s benefit and resources cost. The intersection
represents the range of resources each dam is willing to accept.
range of values [Rimin , Rimax ] that each dam i is willing to
accept. Any additional resource beyond Rimax will yield a
negative dam’s utility as the cost will be higher than the dam’s
benefit. The range can be seen from Fig. 10 to be [0, 13] and
[0, 15] for the first and second dams, respectively. The first
dam has a smaller range as its utility is lower than the second
dam, starting at 12 units of resources. This utility is lower as
the first dam has a smaller power production P1 and a higher
initial resilience index that causes the changes in B1(R1) to
be small.
In Fig. 11, we show the utilities of the dams as given by
(19). We can see that both dams have nonnegative utilities only
in the ranges discussed before, i.e., [0, 13] for the first dam and
[0, 15] for the second dam. Fig. 11 also shows that both utilities
are concave and each has a maximum value at a certain amount
of resources. The first dam has its maximum utility when it
uses 7 units of resources, while the second dam can achieve its
maximum at 9 units of resources. These values represent the
maximum distance between the benefit and the cost in Fig. 10.
Note that, according to the proposed framework, the owners
of the dams are willing to accept resources in their feasible
ranges regardless of their maximum utility. This is because the
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Fig. 11: Dam’s utilities relation with the number of allocated
resources.
extra resources will help improve their resilience.
In Fig. 12, we show the principal’s utility calculated for
each dam. Fig. 12 shows two curves: one for each dam
where the second curve is plotted upside down. The horizontal
axes show the amount of resources allocated to each dam,
while the remaining resources are allocated to the other dam.
Therefore, the principal’s total utility, at each allocation, is the
summation of the values from the two curves corresponding
to this allocation. Fig. 12 corroborates the result of Lemma 1
where we showed that the principal’s utility calculated for
each dam separately represents a monotonically increasing
convex sequence. From Fig. 12, we can see that the principal
achieves a higher utility by allocating resources to the first
dam. This stems from the fact that the first dam has a lower
power production P1 and a higher initial resilience, i.e., lower
B1(R1). Fig. 12 also has two solid vertical lines, each of which
representing the maximum number of resources Rimax for a
dam. Any allocation of resources beyond these lines will no
longer be feasible as it yields negative dams’ utilities. The lines
correspond to the maximum resources in the feasible range for
each dam (13 for the first dam and 15 for the second dam).
The optimal allocation in this case is to allocate 13 units of
resources to the first dam and 7 units of resources to the second
dam.
In Fig. 13, we show the resilience index as a function of
the amount of resource allocated to each dam. The horizontal
axis shows the resources allocated to each dam separately. The
two curves show the possible resilience index improvements
for both dams. Fig. 13 shows that the first dam has a higher
initial resilience index, however, theoretically, both dams can
reach their maximum resilience index. The values of the
resilience indices for both dams, achieved at the optimal
resource allocation, are marked with black squares. From
Fig. 13, we can see that the first dam’s resilience index at the
optimal allocation equals 0.85, while the second dam achieves
a resilience index of 0.5. This is due to the fact that the first
dam has a higher initial resilience index and it is allocated
more resources. Fig. 13 shows that the first dam achieves about
70% increase over its initial resilience index, while the second
dam achieves about 50% increase over its initial resilience
0 5 10 15 200
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
Resources allocated to the first dam
Pr
in
ci
pa
l’s
 u
tili
ty
 fo
r t
he
 fi
rs
t d
am
05101520 0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
Resources allocated to the second dam
Pr
in
ci
pa
l’s
 u
tili
ty
 fo
r t
he
 s
ec
on
d 
da
m
Fig. 12: The principal’s utility for each individual dam with
respect to the number of the allocated resources to this dam.
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Fig. 13: Resilience Index for each dam as a relation in the
amount of allocated resources to each dam.
index. This makes the average increase of the resilience index
in the system about 60%.
We next study the effect of varying the reward that the prin-
cipal charges for a unit of resources on the optimal solution.
We apply the same parameters as the previous experiments but
the reward per resources is now varied from $100 to $800.
Fig. 14 shows the principal’s utility when applying the
proposed allocation and its utility when allocating resources to
only one of the dams. We see that the principal can achieve its
highest utility at the value of $700 per a resources unit. On the
other hand, the value of $100 is shown not to be enough for the
principal to achieve a positive utility. The values in the range
[$200− $400] yield a negative utility for the second dam,
therefore the optimal allocation is to allocate the maximum
amount to the first dam. In the range [$400− $700], both
dams can achieve positive utilities and, hence, the solution
involves both dams in the process of resources allocation. At
the value of $800, the first dam will achieve negative utility
so resources are allocated to the second dam only, i.e., its
maximum allowed value. From Fig. 14, we can also see that
the principal can achieve a higher utility if it allocated all the
resources to the first dam for reward values of $400 and $500.
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Fig. 14: Principal’s utility as a relation in the reward charged
per unit of resources.
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Fig. 15: Principal’s utility under the proposed allocation and
the introduced reward-optimized allocation.
This is because the proposed solution is primarily centered
around improving the resilience index and not maximizing
the principal’s reward. Hence, it allocates all of the available
resources, as long as the principal achieves a positive utility.
From Fig. 14, we can see that the proposed solution allocates
18 and 12 to the first dam for the reward values of $400
and $500, respectively. The remaining resources, i.e., 2 and
8 respectively are allocated to the second dam although they
caused the principal’s utility to be lower.
In Fig. 15, for comparison purposes, we introduce a slight
modification to our dynamic programming procedure to find
the optimized solution from the rewards point of view. The
main difference between the reward-optimized allocation and
our original proposed allocation is that the principal does
not have to allocate all the available resources. Instead, the
principal allocates resources up to the limit that keeps its utility
increasing. For instance, at a reward value of $400, the reward-
optimized allocation assigns 18 units of resources to the first
dam and nothing to the second dam, compared to 18 and 2
in the original proposed allocation. This helps the principal to
achieve a higher utility at $400 and $500 as shown in Fig. 15.
This reward-optimized solution coincides with the first dam’s
single allocation in Fig. 14 for the same rewards range.
The extra reward achieved using the reward-optimized allo-
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Fig. 16: Average resilience index under the proposed allocation
and the introduced reward-optimized allocation.
cation comes at the cost of the dams’ resilience. Fig. 16 shows
the average resilience index for both dams when using the two
allocations. We see that at reward values of $400 and $500, the
average resilience index of the reward-optimized allocation is
3% and 13% less than our proposed allocation, respectively.
This is because less resources are used and, hence, dams can
achieve less resilience improvement.
Finally, we show the average resilience index multiplied by
the principal’s utility to show the combined effect of both,
we call this the average resilience utility for the principal.
Fig. 17 shows that the gap between the proposed allocation
and the reward-optimized allocation is smaller than the case
of comparing just the utilities. This happens as the proposed
mechanism allocates all the available resources which helps
increase dams’ resilience indices and hence the average. In the
reward-optimized allocation, some resources are not allocated
if they will cause the principal’s utility to go lower, hence,
dams achieve lower resilience indices and the average will be
lower. From Fig. 17, we can see that the reward-optimized
allocation slightly outperforms the proposed-allocation in the
average resilience utility only at the value of $400. It is slightly
lower at the value of $500 and coincides with the proposed
allocation at all the other values. It is also clear from Fig. 17
that our proposed allocation outperforms allocating resources
to only one of the dams in terms of the combined effect of
principal’s reward and dams’ resilience.
Here, we note that finding the solution of the reward-
optimized allocation increases the complexity of the dynamic
programming optimization problem to O
(
N ·(Rmax−Rmin)N
)
as the principal needs to check all partial resource allocations.
This significantly increases the solution space and the time
needed to reach the optimal solution. Moreover, this allocation
will achieve a lower average improvement in the resilience in-
dex as less resources are allocated. Note that, the last constraint
in (21) needs to be relaxed to
∑N
i=1Ri ≤ R to allow for partial
allocations. Given the complexity of the reward-optimized
allocation and the limited improvement it can achieve over our
proposed allocation, the proposed allocation will be superior
in allocating the resources to a system of multiple CIs.
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Fig. 17: The average resilience utility for the principal with
the rewards value.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel framework to
study and optimize the resilience of CIs. A novel resilience
index has been introduced that is derived from a Markov
chain representing the infrastructure’s performance state. The
state is defined to be either success, warning, or failure. The
framework focuses on the effect of the probability of transition
from warning to failure on the resilience index. We have then
proposed a Bayesian network to model the infrastructure’s
physical components and their effect on the resilience index.
To prioritize the infrastructure’s components in the resilience
improvement process, we have introduced a Bayesian network
algorithm that captures the effect of each component on the
infrastructure’s probability of failure. We have evaluated the
proposed framework in a case study of hydropower dams. We
have defined a problem of allocating resources to a system
of multiple CIs and studied it within the context of the case
study. The problem is modeled using contract theory in which
a system operator wants to maximize the economic benefit
from allocating the resources to CIs. Dynamic programming
optimization has been used to derive the optimal solution for
the problem of resource allocation. Results have shown that
the proposed framework outperforms other allocation methods
both in the economic reward for the system operator as well
as the average resilience utility.
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